

A stochastic dynamic Dorfman-Steiner model

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03/29/2011

Outline

I Introduction

II Dynamic stochastic (P)ricing and (A)dvertising models

III A special class of P&A models

IV Generalizations and extensions

I Topic: Revenue Management, Pricing

dynamic **pricing**

- there is an extensive literature on „dynamic pricing“
- structural properties for continuous/discrete time, determ./ stoch. models
- **continuous time:** Gallego, van Ryzin 1994 (time-homogeneous)
and: McAfee, te Velde 2008 (time-inhomogeneous)

dynamic **pricing and advertising**

- dynamic models:
 - carry-over-effects, deterministic (Arrow & Nerlove 1962; Sethi)
 - innovation- und imitation effects; diffusion processes (Bass 1961)
- MacDonald, Rasmussen 2009: Gallego, van Ryzin - model incl. advertising
- today: **McAfee, te Velde – model, including advertising**

Literature

„Optimal marketing-mix“

Dorfman, R., P. O. Steiner (1954). *Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality*, American Economic Review, Vol. 44, 826-836.

„Dynamic pricing“

Gallego, G., G. van Ryzin (1994). *Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons*. Management Science, Vol. 40, 999-1020.

(* **McAfee, R. P., V. te Velde (2008).** *Dynamic Pricing with Constant Demand Elasticity*. Production and Operations Management, Vol. 17, No. 4, 432-438.

„Dynamic pricing and advertising“

MacDonald, L., H. Rasmussen (2009). *Revenue Management with Dynamic Pricing and Advertising*. Production Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Vol. 9, 126-136.

The Dorfman-Steiner Theorem

Theorem 1 (Dorfman-Steiner)

- Assumptions:
- one product, one market
 - marketing instruments: price a and advertising w
 - rate of sales $\lambda(a, w)$ and cost function are known

Problem (1 period): (quantity • unit profit – advertising costs)

Claim:
$$\max_{a, w > 0} \{ \lambda(a, w) \cdot (a - cost) - w \}$$

For the optimal pricing and advertising actions

$$\frac{w^*(b)}{\lambda(a^*(b), w^*(b)) \cdot a^*(b)} \equiv \frac{\text{advertising elasticity}}{\text{price elasticity}} \cdot$$

II Dynamic stochastic pricing and advertising models

Problem: b_0 identical items

finite time horizon, continuous time, **monopoly situation**

Dynamic: rate of sales is known; the intensity of the Poisson process decreases in price and increases in advertising expenses

Actions: price asked and amount money spent on advertising

Objective: maximize expected **profit**;
find an **optimal non-anticipating policy**; it will depend on the
(present) inventory level (state) and time

Notation

retail price:	a	$\in A = \mathbb{R}^+$; the set of possible prices
advertising expenses:	w	$\in W = \mathbb{R}^+$; the set of poss. adv. levels
time:	t	$t \in [0, T]$, (actual time, not time-to-go)
rate of sales:	$\lambda_t(a, w)$	(average number of sales in t per unit of time)
state space:	$\{0, 1, 2, \dots, b_0\}$	number of items b left
random inventory:	B_t	at time t
policy:	$h_t(b) = (a_t(b), w_t(b))$,	$t \in [0, T]$

Problem formulation

We maximize the expected profit:

$$\max_h E \left[\int_0^T a_t(B_t) \cdot \lambda_t(a_t(B_t), w_t(B_t)) dt - \int_0^T w_t(B_t) dt \mid B_0 = b_0 \right],$$

where h is a non-anticipating Markov policy.

III A special class of P&A models

rate of sales $\lambda_t(a, w) = u(t) \cdot g(w) \cdot (1 - F(a))$ (Poisson arrival process)

→ **special case** $\lambda_t(a, w) := u(t) \cdot w^\delta \cdot a^{-\varepsilon}$, time-inhomogeneous,
constant price- and advertising elasticities $\varepsilon > 1$, $0 < \delta < 1$.

prob. of sale $(1 - F(a)) := a^{-\varepsilon}$ (Pareto distributed; $F(a)$ CDF)

price elasticity $\frac{a}{1 - F(a)} \cdot \frac{\partial(1 - F(a))}{\partial a} = \varepsilon$

advertising $g(w) := w^\delta$, $0 < \delta < 1$ (concave increasing in w)

advert. elasticity $\frac{w}{g(w)} \cdot \frac{\partial g(w)}{\partial w} = \delta$

Explicit solutions of a particular Dorfman-Steiner model

Theorem 2 For $\lambda_t(a, w) = u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w^\delta$, $\gamma := \frac{\varepsilon - \delta}{1 - \delta} > 1$ we obtain:

Value function
$$V_t(b) = \alpha_t \cdot \beta_b = \frac{\varepsilon - \delta}{\varepsilon} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon - \delta}} \cdot U_t^{\gamma - 1} \cdot \beta_b$$

Optimal prices
$$a_t(b) := \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \cdot \underbrace{\alpha_t \cdot (\beta_b - \beta_{b-1})}_{\Delta V_t(b)} = \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon - \delta}} \cdot U_t^{\gamma - 1} \cdot \beta_b^{\frac{1}{1 - \gamma}}$$

Optimal adv. levels
$$w_t(b) := \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{u(t) \cdot \delta} \cdot a_t^{\varepsilon - 1}\right)^{\frac{1}{\delta - 1}} = u(t)^{\frac{1}{1 - \delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon - \delta}} \cdot U_t^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}} \cdot \beta_b$$

For all t and b :
$$\frac{w_t^*(b)}{\lambda_t(a_t^*(b), w_t^*(b)) \cdot a_t^*(b)} \equiv \frac{\delta}{\varepsilon} \quad (\text{Dorfman-Steiner property})$$

Sketch of the proof: Step (1) Optimality conditions

The Bellman-equation for this case: (boundary conditions: $V_T(b) = V_t(0) = 0$)

$$\max_{a>0, w>0} \left\{ \underbrace{V_t'(b) + u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w^\delta \cdot (a - \Delta V_t(b))}_{=: K(a, w)} - w \right\} = 0.$$

Optimality conditions (for price and advertising): ($\Delta V_t(b) := V_t(b) - V_t(b-1)$)

(price) $\frac{\partial K(a, w)}{\partial a} \stackrel{!}{=} 0 \iff a_t^*(b) = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \cdot \Delta V_t(b)$

(advertising) $\frac{\partial K(a, w)}{\partial w} \stackrel{!}{=} 0 \iff w_t^*(b) = \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{u(t) \cdot \delta} \cdot a_t^*(b)^{\varepsilon-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta-1}}$

The Hessian matrix of K is negative definite, and the point $(a_t^*(b), w_t^*(b))$ is a (local) maximum; for this class it is actually a global maximum.

Step (2): Solving the Bellman-Equation

The formulas of the optimal price and advertising policies yield the following nonlinear difference (**in b**) – differential (**in t**)-equation; $c = \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\delta-1}} \cdot \left(\frac{\varepsilon - \delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^\gamma$ and

$$\gamma := \frac{\varepsilon - \delta}{1 - \delta} > 1;$$

$$0 = V_t'(b) + u(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot \frac{c}{\gamma} \cdot \left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\right)^{1-\gamma} \cdot \Delta V_t(b)^{1-\gamma}, \quad (*)$$

Idea: Separate the effect of time and inventory, i.e. assume $V_t(b) = \alpha_t \cdot \beta_b$ with a (time-) function α_t and an (inventory-) sequence β_b .

We thus obtain the following **conditions** for an unique solution of (*) (cf. McAfee, te Velde (2008) for the case without advertising).

Step (3): Separation of time and inventory


(1) effect of time: The time-dependence is given by the function

$$\alpha_t = (c \cdot U_t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \quad \text{where} \quad U_t := \int_t^T u(s)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} ds \stackrel{\text{time hom.}}{=} u^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot (T-t)$$

(2) effect of inventory: The sequence $(\beta_b)_{b \geq 0}$ satisfies the (implicit) recursion

$$\beta_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \beta_b \cdot (\beta_b - \beta_{b-1})^{\gamma-1} = \left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} \right)^{1-\gamma}, \quad b = 1, 2, 3, \dots$$


Illustrations: (i) The (inventory-) sequence $(\beta_b)_{b \geq 0}$



The sequence is nonnegative, concave and increasing in b for all $\gamma > 1$.


Illustrations: (ii) Solution of the Bellman-equation

value function




Illustrations: (iii) The optimal policy

optimal price policy



optimal advertising policy



Observations: the (optimal) price is monotone decreasing price in time;
the (optimal) advertising policy is increasing in time.

Structural properties and sensitivity analysis

Theorem 3 (Structural properties **for the solved model**)

- (A1) The **value function** is a concave *decreasing* function **in t** ,
and it is a concave and *increasing* function **in b** .
- (A2) The optimal **price decreases in b** , **advertising rate increases in b** .
- (S1) The optimal **pricing policy decreases in t** .
- (S2) If $u(t)$ is decreasing in t , the optimal **advertising increases in t** .

Additional results

Based on the explicit solution formulas we can derive several other results:

- (for example)
- formulas for the expected evolution of the inventory-level
 - state probabilities
 - the distribution of the (time) points of sale
 - formulas for the expected sales prices
 - ideas for efficiently simulating these and other quantities
 - asymptotic properties

IV Extensions and generalizations

- (1) A generalized 2-dimensional model
- (2) A multi-dimensional model
- (3) The discounted price and advertising model
- (4) A particular deterministic inventory problem on \mathbb{R}^+

IV.1 A generalized 2-dimensional model

the intensity function: $\lambda_t(a, w) = u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w^\delta$, where $u(t) > 0$ and constant price resp. advertise elasticities $\varepsilon > 1$, $0 < \delta < 1$.

gen. payment function: $\bar{R}_t(a, w) = \lambda_t(a, w) \cdot \underline{v} \cdot \underline{a} - \underline{k} \cdot \underline{w}$, $v, k > 0$

Solution formulas:

$$V_t(b) = \frac{\frac{\delta}{k^{\delta-\varepsilon}} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{v^{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\varepsilon-\delta}{\varepsilon}\right) \cdot U_t^{\gamma-1} \cdot \beta_b}{=} \left(\frac{v^\varepsilon}{k^\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot V_t^{(1,1)}(b)$$

$$a_t(b) = \frac{\frac{\delta}{k^{\delta-\varepsilon}} \cdot \frac{\delta}{v^{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot U_t^{\gamma-1} \cdot \beta_b^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}}{=} \left(\frac{v^\delta}{k^\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot a_t^{(1,1)}(b)$$

$$w_t(b) = \frac{\frac{\varepsilon}{k^{\delta-\varepsilon}} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{v^{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot u(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot U_t^{\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}} \cdot \beta_b}{=} \left(\frac{v^\varepsilon}{k^\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot w_t^{(1,1)}(b)$$

IV.2 A multi-dimensional model

sales rate: $\lambda_t(a, \vec{w}) = \lambda_t(a, w_1, \dots, w_J) = u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot \prod_j w_j^{\delta_j}, \quad \delta_j \geq 0$

payment function: $\bar{R}_t(a, \vec{w}) := \bar{R}_t(a, w_1, \dots, w_J) := \lambda_t(a, \vec{w}) \cdot v \cdot a - \sum_{j \in J} k_j \cdot w_j, \quad k_j \geq 0$

Bellman-Equ.: $\max_{a>0, \vec{w}>0} \left\{ V'_t(b) + u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot \prod_j w_j^{\delta_j} \cdot (v \cdot a - \Delta V_t(b)) - \sum_j k_j \cdot w_j \right\} = 0$

FOC (i) $\frac{v \cdot a}{\varepsilon} = v \cdot a - \Delta V_t(b) \quad (\text{unchanged})$

(ii) $\frac{\delta_1}{k_1} \cdot w_1^{-1} \cdot \prod_j w_j^{\delta_j} = \frac{u(t)^{-1} \cdot a^\varepsilon}{v \cdot a - \Delta V_t(b)} \Rightarrow$

$$\frac{w_j^*(b)}{w_k^*(b)} = \frac{\delta_j \cdot k_k}{\delta_k \cdot k_j} \quad \forall j, k \in J$$

Hence

$$\lambda_t(a, \vec{w}) = u(t) \cdot \underbrace{\prod_j \left(\frac{\delta_j \cdot k_1}{\delta_1 \cdot k_j} \right)^{\delta_j}}_{=: \tilde{u}(t)} \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w_1^{\sum_j \delta_j} = \tilde{u}(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w_1^{\tilde{\delta}} =: \tilde{\lambda}_t(a, w_1).$$

$$\bar{R}(a, \vec{w}) = \tilde{\lambda}_t(a, w_1) \cdot v \cdot a - \underbrace{\sum_{j \in J} k_j \cdot \frac{\delta_j \cdot k_1}{\delta_1 \cdot k_j}}_{=: \tilde{k}} \cdot w_1. \quad \text{If } 0 < \tilde{\delta} = \sum_j \delta_j < 1 < \varepsilon, \text{ we can reduce}$$

the multi-dimensional model to the generalized **2-dimensional** model.

1+1-dim.	$\tilde{\delta}$	$\tilde{\varepsilon}$	\tilde{k}	\tilde{v}	$\tilde{u}(t)$
J +1-dim. model	$\sum_j \delta_j$	ε	$\frac{k_1}{\delta_1} \cdot \sum_{j \in J} \delta_j = \frac{k_1}{\delta_1} \cdot \tilde{\delta}$	v	$u(t) \cdot \left(\frac{k_1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\tilde{\delta}} \cdot \prod_j \left(\frac{\delta_j}{k_j} \right)^{\delta_j}$

IV.3 The discounted price and advertising model

problem:
$$\max_{a,w} E \left[\int_0^T \frac{e^{-r \cdot t}}{0} \cdot a_t \cdot \lambda_t(a, w) dt - \int_0^T \frac{e^{-r \cdot t}}{0} \cdot w_t dt \mid B_0 = b_0 \right]$$

Diff.-DE
$$0 = V_t'(b) + u(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot \frac{c}{\gamma} \cdot \left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} \right)^{1-\gamma} \cdot \Delta V_t(b)^{1-\gamma} - \underline{r \cdot V_t(b)}$$

time effect: For $r > 0$ we obtain

$$\tilde{U}_t := -e^{-\gamma \cdot r \cdot t} \cdot \int_t^T e^{\gamma \cdot r \cdot s} \cdot u(s)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} ds \stackrel{\text{time hom.}}{=} \frac{u^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot c}{\gamma \cdot r} \cdot (1 - e^{-\gamma \cdot r \cdot (T-t)}) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \xrightarrow{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{u^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot c}{\gamma \cdot r} \cdot (1 - e^{-\gamma \cdot r \cdot t}) \\ \xrightarrow{r \rightarrow 0} u^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot c \cdot (T-t) \end{array} \right.$$

$$\alpha_t = \left(-c \cdot e^{-\gamma \cdot r \cdot t} \cdot \int_t^T e^{\gamma \cdot r \cdot s} \cdot u(s) ds \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} = (c \cdot \tilde{U}_t)^{\gamma^{-1}} \xrightarrow{r \rightarrow 0} (c \cdot U_t)^{\gamma^{-1}}$$

IV.4 The Dorfman-Steiner model with a continuous state space as a deterministic inventory problem

Let $b(t) \in \mathbb{R}$, $b(0) = b_0$ and $b'(t) = -\lambda_t(a, w) = -u(t) \cdot a^{-\varepsilon} \cdot w^\delta$, if $b(t) > 0$

det. inventory problem: $\max_{a, w} \left[\int_0^T a_t(b(t)) \cdot \lambda_t(a_t(b(t)), w_t(b(t))) - w_t(b(t)) dt \right]$

Bellman-Equ. (PDE) $0 = V_t'(b) + u(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot \frac{c}{\gamma} \cdot \left(\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} \right)^{1-\gamma} \cdot \frac{\partial V_t(b)^{1-\gamma}}{\partial b} (-r \cdot V_t'(b))$

(boundary conditions: $V_T(b) = V_t(0) = 0$)

Again (as before): $V_t(b) = \alpha(t) \cdot \beta(b)$

time effect: $\alpha_t = (c \cdot U_t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}$, where $U_t := \int_t^T u(s)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} ds \stackrel{\text{time hom.}}{=} u^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \cdot (T-t)$

Inventory effect (fct.): $\beta(0) = 0$ and $\beta(b)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \cdot \beta'(b) = \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}$, $b \in \mathbb{R}^+$

Solution (Bernoulli-DE): $\beta(b) = b^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \Leftrightarrow b = \beta(b)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}$

\Rightarrow value function: $V_t(b) = k^{\frac{\delta}{\delta-\varepsilon}} \cdot v^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon}\right)^{\frac{\delta}{\varepsilon-\delta}} \cdot \left(\frac{\varepsilon-\delta}{\varepsilon}\right) \cdot U_t^{\gamma-1} \cdot \beta(b)$

opt. rate of sales $b'(t) = -\lambda_t(a_t^*(b(t)), w_t^*(b(t))) = -\frac{u(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}}}{U_t} \cdot \beta(b(t))^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \stackrel{\text{time hom.}}{=} -\frac{b(t)}{(T-t)}$

opt. inventory evolution $\Rightarrow b(t) = b(0) \cdot \frac{U_t}{U_0} \stackrel{\text{time hom.}}{=} b(0) \cdot \frac{T-t}{T} = b_0 - \frac{b_0}{T} \cdot t$

and the inventory decreases at a **constant rate** from b_0 at $t=0$ to 0 at $t=T$;
cf. an almost linear decreasing expected inventory level in the discrete case.



Thank you for your attention!